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thE Many FaCEs oF oBjECtivity1
los múltiPles rostros de la objectividad
David Macarthur
aBstraCt
In this paper I present a positive progressive picture of  Putnam's philosophy. Accor-
ding to this way of  seeing things, Putnam is a normative cartographer of  our linguistic 
practices who has over time refined his understanding of  the concepts of  truth and 
verification and their complex relationship from discourse to discourse. Looked at in 
this way Putnam is primarily a philosopher of  objective normativity, who explores 
the various conceptions of  objectivity with which we operate as well as resisting 
the excesses of  both metaphysics and skepticism which do violence to our ordinary 
and scientific practices. However, Putnam sees himself  as a philosopher of  ‘reality’ 
focused on “the realism issue”, a metaphysically inflationary way of  thinking that, I 
argue, stands in the way of  his deepest insights. 
KEyWords: realism, antirealism, Metaphysical Realism, metaphysical realism (uncap-
italized), internal realism, common sense realism, objectivity, conceptual normativity, 
common sense, metaphysics, skepticism, quietism.
rEsuMEn
En este artículo, presento una imagen positiva y progresiva de la filosodfía de Putnam. 
De acuerdo con este enfoque, Putnam es un cartógrafo normativo de nuestras prác-
ticas lingüísticas que, a lo largo del tiempo, ha refinado su comprensión de los con-
ceptos de verdad y verificación y sus relaciones complejas de un discurso a otro. Así 
contemplado, Putnam es principalmente un filósofo de la normatividad objetiva que 
explora las diversas concepciones de la objetividad con las que operamos, además de 
resistir los excesos de la metafísica y el escepticismo que estropean nuestras prácticas 
normales y científicas. No obstante, Putnam se ve a sí mismo como un filósofo de la 
“realidad” que se centra en el “problema del realismo”, una modo metafísicamente 
inflacionista de pensar que, defiendo, obstaculiza sus ideas más profundas.
1 I’d like to thank Gary Ebbs for comments on a draft of  this paper. 
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PaLaBras CLavE: realismo, antirrealismo, Realismo Metafísico, realismo metafí-
sico (sin mayúsculas); realismo interno; realismo de sentido común; objetividad; nor-
matividad conceptual; sentido común; metafísica; escepticismo; quietismo.
“different sorts of  judgments possess different sorts of  objectivity.”
Putnam, (2002b, 6).
“the fact that the difficulties are in a sense the same does not mean that they do 
not require special treatment”
Putnam (2012, 342).
Leaving aside scientific realism, which specifically concerns the existence of  the 
unobservables posited by successful science (in opposition to, say, instrumentalism), 
I want to focus upon the shift in Putnam’s general semantic realist allegiances: from 
Metaphysical Realism (capitalized, for a reason I shall explain below) to “internal 
realism” (which, despite the label is a form of  antirealism); and from internal 
realism to common sense (or natural or pragmatic) realism. Henceforth when 
I use the terms “realism” and “antirealism” I intend to refer to semantic views 
about the relation between truth and verification (or rational assertibility).2
Putnam’s changes in realist allegiance can seem mysterious for several reasons. 
For one thing both Metaphysical Realism and internal realism are, or seem to be, 
substantial philosophical positions; for example, the first accepts that there is one 
true and complete description of  things, whereas the second denies that. Yet Putnam 
has cryptically remarked that “commonsense realism by itself  isn’t a metaphysical 
position, or even an antimetaphysical position” (1998, 242). Why, then, bother to 
call common sense realism a form of  “realism” – which seems to suggest some 
commonality (say, of  status or explanatory pretension) with his previous realist and 
antirealist allegiances? Alternatively, if  we see what he has called his “long journey 
from realism back to realism” (1999, 49) as nothing more than a movement away 
from, then back towards, a non-epistemic conception of  truth, one might well 
wonder what the overall gain has been.
There is also the problem that it is relatively easy to find oneself  unable to see 
the forest for the trees when one concentrates on all the detailed argumentation 
2 To say that the realism/antirealism issue is semantic is a comment about its formulation. Of  
course, since these positions involve the concepts of  truth and reference they have ontological 
implications too. 
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along the path Putnam has taken including debates surrounding such controversial 
matters as: the bearing of  empirical and conceptual discovery on the a priori; 
the model theoretic argument and the question of  what fixes reference; the 
doctrine of  conceptual relativity in optional theoretical languages; the possibility 
of  reference to the same ‘unobservables’ in physics despite errors or change in 
physical theory3; the meaning of  natural kind terms; overcoming of  the fact/value 
dualism; and direct realism in the philosophy of  perception.
The approach I favour aims to find a progressive story of  accumulating insight. 
Before I explain the approach I want to enter an important qualification about 
Putnam’s use of  the term “realism”; and it will help us orient ourselves if  we 
briefly set aside an initially plausible but, I believe, relatively fruitless conception 
of  what Putnam is up to.
Firstly, the term “realism” might be thought to concern, first and foremost, 
matters of  Ontology, especially the attempt to articulate some notion of  a mind-
independent world. It is worth noting, then, that throughout all these periods, 
including the internal realist period when Putnam notoriously said that ”the mind 
and world make up the mind and the world” (1981, xi), Putnam always accepted 
that the reality of, say, stars, glaciers and electrons was causally independent of  
minds. And he always accepted a thesis of  logical independence too: the existence 
of  stars, glaciers and electrons neither entails, nor is entailed by, the existence of  
minds, whether considered individually or collectively.4 That is, the internal realist 
is still a realist regarding these sorts of  entities (or was intended to be such) – since 
Putnam allowed that verification of  such facts need not be humanly possible – 
even if  he also counted, in Kantian fashion, as a kind of  anti-realist in virtue of  
identifying truth with a form of  idealized verification. Putnam has long argued 
that if  one does not mean either causal or logical independence then it is unclear 
what “mind-independent” is supposed to mean in realist-antirealist debates (e.g., 
1992, 355). Consequently, the appeal to “mind-independent” reality does not 
seem capable of  sustaining any progressive explanation of  Putnam's changes in 
realist allegiances. For present purposes, then, I shall set this issue aside – though 
it will be necessary to return to it later.
3 For instance, in 1911 Niels Bohr was capable of  referring to electrons despite holding an 
inadequate theory of  electrons.
4 Though certain ways of  describing mental states do have such implications e.g. perceptual 
verbs whose use implies success. If  “S sees O” it is implied that O exists. But it is possible to 
use less committal locutions e.g. in this case, appealing to perceptual experience.
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Secondly, one might think that the shifts in realist allegiance we have canvassed 
are a matter of  Putnam’s offering different answers over time to what he has 
described as the great question of  realism, “How does the mind or language hook 
on to the world?”5 But this, too, would be misconceived. Post-1978 Putnam holds 
that this is not a fully intelligible question since it presupposes a God’s eye view 
from which we are supposed to be able to compare mind and language with the 
world itself, where mind and language are somehow conceived independently of  
the world; and the world independently of  mind and language. It follows that we 
cannot appeal to changes in answers to this question to explain Putnam’s realist 
allegiances. Of  course, it is true that Putnam has changed his views about the 
conditions for our referential abilities in different regions of  thought but there is 
no progressive big story to tell about reference as such because Putnam has long 
been an anti-essentialist about what constitutes referring.6
If  we are not to understand Putnam’s movement from Metaphysical Realism 
to internal realism to common sense realism in terms of  either mind-independent 
‘objects’ or intentionality then how are we to understand it?
In this paper I want to cast light on Putnam’s philosophical motivation for these 
shifts of  position by emphasizing two pragmatist themes that are not normally 
brought to bear on this aspect of  his thought. The two closely related themes are: 
1) the practical priority of  the normative in everyday and scientific discourse over 
the purely metaphysical matter of  Ontology; and 2) the importance of  articulating 
the normative dimension of  our practices – which centrally involves articulating 
the objectivity that these practices institute or make allowance for – from an 
engaged practitioner’s point of  view. 7
5 For example, Maximillian De Gaynesford (2006) takes the theme of  thought’s intentional 
directedness to reality to be the key that unlocks Putnam’s thought. 
6 Putnam notes “that reference is a ‘family resemblance’ notion (there being no ‘essence’ of  
referring), and that the notion of  reference is constantly undergoing extensions…” (Hill (ed.), 
1993, 406, fn. 56). See also (1988, 11).
7 The present paper can be read as a sympathetic critical response to Gary Ebbs’s reconstruc-
tive reading of  Putnam which is centred on the largely correct thought that “our participation 
in everyday and scientific linguistic practices subjects our statements to norms that determine 
what we are talking about, when we agree, and when we disagree. Putnam’s project is to clarify 
our implicit, practice-based understanding of  these norms” (1992, 2).
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thE Priority oF thE norMativE
One way to see what goes wrong in approaching the question of  realism in 
terms of  radical mind-independence or big “R” (i.e. metaphysical) Representation 
is that we seem to need a conception of  all the ‘Objects’ there are from a God's-
eye point of  view in order to conduct this sort of  inquiry. On this way of  seeing 
things we must start with Ontology – understood as a foundational metaphysics of  
Being which allegedly tells us what basic kinds of  ‘objects’ collectively constitute 
the fabric of  the world. Then we ask questions about their explanatory status and 
how the mind hooks onto them. But, for Putnam, philosophy cannot begin with 
Ontology since, for one thing, it faces insuperable epistemological problems, and, 
as we will see, the problem of  conceptual relativity. It must begin, rather, with a 
sense of  the normative landscape we inhabit from an insider's perspective on our 
many and various discourses, as he explains:
In place of  Ontology (note the capital “O”), I shall be defending what one might 
call pragmatic pluralism, the recognition that it is no accident that in everyday language 
we employ many many different kinds of  discourses, discourses subject to different 
standards and possessing different sorts of  applications, with different logical and 
grammatical features, different “language games” in Wittgenstein’s sense – no 
accident because it is an illusion that there could be just one sort of  language game 
which could be sufficient for the description of  all of  reality! (2004, 21)
I want to follow the suggestion of  this passage and argue that we do most 
justice to the bulk of  Putnam’s thought (and, I believe, to its most lasting insights) 
if  we see the changes from one form of  realism to another as reflecting a lifelong 
meditation on, and attempt to articulate, the indispensable objective normative 
dimension of  our actual practices of  rational thought and criticism; most 
especially, our use of  the central normative terms “understanding”, “truth” and 
“justification” in one or other domain of  discourse.8
For the purposes of  this paper I want to set aside discussion of  “understanding” 
and concentrate on “truth” and “justification”. From this perspective Putnam can be 
understood to be asking such questions as: What counts as justification in scientific 
or moral or aesthetic (etc.) discourses? How objective is it? And what is the relation 
between truth and justification in science, say, or ethics? – where allowance is made 
for the possibility that different answers will be appropriate in different discourses.
8 Putnam has called this a matter of  “trying to understand the life we lead with our concepts 
in each of  these distinct areas” (2012, 386).
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What I would like to argue is that Putnam’s realist allegiances are a testament 
to his progressively insightful attempt to explain the objectivity of  our judgments 
in different regions of  discourse: to demonstrate both the reality of  the topics 
of  our thought and talk (by way of  an account of  truth and reference for the 
discourse) as well as the kind of  correctness attaching to judgments about them 
which may vary as the subject matter and circumstances vary.
stagE-sEtting: thE sEarCh For a third Way
In order to approach the question of  what the objectivity of  our normative 
notions comes to for Putnam it is important to do some stage-setting. Let us 
consider this remark,
On the one hand our understanding of  our concepts, and our employment of  
them in our richly conceptually structured lives, is not a mystery transaction with 
intangible objects, a transaction with something over and above the objects that 
make up our bodies and our environments; yet as soon as one tries to take a 
normative notion like the understanding of  a concept or Wittgenstein’s notion of  
the use of  a word, and equate that notion with some notion from stimulus-response 
psychology (“being disposed to make certain responses to certain stimuli”), or a 
notion from computational psychology, or a notion from the physiology of  the 
brain, then the normativity disappears, and hence the concept itself  disappears. 
(2012, 384)
This passage concerns the difficulty, in our attempt to understand the objectivity 
of  central normative notions such as truth, justification and understanding – of  
steering clear of  the twin threats of: on the one hand, the hyperbolization of  
objectivity in metaphysical thinking (e.g. the Platonic or mathematical realist 
notion of  “intangible objects”, the Metaphysical Realist’s conception of  a fixed 
realm of  metaphysically privileged ‘Objects’); and, on the other, the denial or 
denigration of  objectivity in skeptical thought (e.g. reductionism of  one kind 
of  another, be it behaviourist, physiological or physicalist). The criticism of  
this oscillation between subliming objectivity (especially tying the notion to an 
unchanging realm of  metaphysically privileged ‘Objects’ of  some sort) and denying 
objectivity (say through some form of  subjectivism or skepticism), is played out 
again and again in Putnam’s writings. For instance, it explain his frequent attacks 
on the Metaphysical Realists’ notion of  correspondence truth and a metaphysically 
guaranteed reference relation as well as his critiques of  postmodern nihilism and 
Rorty’s relativistic conception of  justification.
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Putnam’s achievement here is to show that we do not need to accept the 
appearance of  a forced choice between an inhuman Objectivity (i.e., “the view 
from nowhere” (Nagel, 1986, 5), “the absolute conception” (Williams, 1985, 139)) 
and no objectivity at all (which is variously called “nihilism” or “skepticism” or 
“relativism”).9 However, it is easy to misunderstand the alternative way of  thinking 
that Putnam pithily expresses thus, “We have… better and worse versions, and that 
is objectivity enough” (1987, 77). This might just seem to raise the question of  
objectivity all over again: Better or worse for whom? Better or worse in what respect? 
Is objectivity a unitary or plural notion? But rather than being problems, such 
questions point the way towards resolutions.
thE ConCEPt and ConCEPtions oF oBjECtivity
To explain Putnam’s thought here it is helpful to employ the Rawlsian distinction 
between concept and conceptions.10 The concept of  objectivity, the abstract idea that 
there are better or worse answers or responses to our questions – which implies 
that simply thinking that p does not make it so that p – is what all conceptions of  
objectivity share in common. But the abstract concept of  objectivity tells us very 
little unless we know what sense we are to attach to these terms in their application to 
specific cases. This is precisely the function of  conceptions of  objectivity. In the history 
of  philosophy there have been many conceptions (or detailed working models) of  
objectivity to provide the ideas of  better and worse with specific content and guide 
us in to how to apply them. Some important conceptions include: 1) the account 
of  objectivity in terms of  objects of  one kind or another (e.g. Plato’s Forms, the 
fixed ‘Objects’ of  Metaphysical Realism, physical objects); 2) the Kantian account 
of  objectivity in terms of  universal principles or rules of  judgment; and 3) the 
conventionalist account of  objectivity in terms of  conventions or intersubjective 
agreements (e.g. the appeal to linguistic conventions).
In Putnam’s way of  thinking our conceptions of  objectivity are plural and ever-
expanding. We make a profound mistake if  we treat any one of  them as what objectivity 
9 It might be noted in passing that this attests to an important difference between Putnam’s 
and Rorty’s versions of  neo-pragmatism. Rorty effectively accepts the appearance of  the forced 
choice and opts for the second alternative: no objectivity. But Rorty is not consistent here, some-
times saying he has abandoned objectivity and sometimes saying he has reduced it to solidarity. 
10 This distinction is taken, adapted somewhat, from John Rawls: “Roughly, the concept is the 
meaning of  the term, while a particular conception includes as well the principles required to 
apply it” (1993, 14, fn. 15).
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really is, once and for all, across all discourses. In the case of  metaphysical object-based 
conceptions such as Metaphysical Realism or Platonism, Putnam has long argued 
for their failure to make full sense (e.g. 2004). How are we supposed to understand, 
say, the idea that it is the world, not us, that chooses what counts as an ‘object’? It 
follows that not every conception in the history of  philosophy is salvageable. Given 
the wide diversity of  discourses, their differing standards and logical properties, any 
given conception – provided that it is coherent – may well apply to some, but certainly 
not to all, aspects of  our lives. In some cases, as we have seen, that will mean we have 
to abandon the conception as incoherent (e.g. Metaphysical Realism); in others we 
have the option of  regarding the conception as a metaphor that points towards the 
application in an imaginative mode (e.g. Platonism about mathematics).
Putnam is trying to get us to see that the core idea of  a better or worse that transcends 
the speaker is presupposed in our many and various practices of  inquiry, judgment 
and adjudicating disputes even if  we spell out the notion of  better or worse in 
different ways on different occasions. This is as true in science and mathematics 
as in such notoriously problematic areas such as ethics and aesthetics where, 
unlike the former cases, agreement on the facts, together with reasonableness and 
rational argument do not tend to guarantee agreement about action or evaluation. 
It is the task for philosophy, on the present reading of  Putnam, to show what 
particular conception of  objectivity, hence what conception of  rational justification, is 
appropriate to each of  the problematic conceptual difficulties we actually confront 
in our lives. And a key part of  that is determining the standards of  justification, and 
what relation particular conceptions of  justification have to the truth.
norMativE insights oF PutnaM’s ProgrEss
Adopting this approach it is possible to tell the story of  Putnam’s realist 
allegiances as a story of  his growing appreciation of  the normative fine structure 
of  rational justification and its differing relation to truth in different areas of  
our lives with words. Let me give a brief  summary of  some of  the highlights of  
Putnam’s progress:
1. The Movement away from Metaphysical Realism
We can see two points emerge as key reasons why Putnam moved away from 
Metaphysical Realism. Firstly, the hyper-objectivist idea that truth is a matter of  
correspondence with worldly facts that are radically mind-independent does no 
real explanatory work for there is no (actual, ideal or imagined) position from 
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which one could verify that this is so. In other words such a ‘correspondence’ has 
no connection to our actual practices of  inquiry and judgment whether in ordinary 
life or the sciences (1981, 72–74). And if  there is a metaphysically privileged 
notion of  object how are we to tell that our ordinary concept of  an object ‘carves 
reality at its joints’? Secondly, Metaphysical Realism implies the conceivability 
of  radical skepticism in at least two senses. Firstly, it is committed to the claim 
that no matter how well justified our judgments are we might conceivably be 
in error, perhaps even global error; and since the error concerns facts that are 
radically mind-independent there may be systematic error that is and remains 
undetectable from the human perspective for eternity. Secondly, our concepts 
might be ‘wrong’ in the sense that they fail to ‘fit’ with the independent order of  
things so despite being in ideal epistemic conditions and being blameless from the 
point of  view of  epistemic practice we might still go wrong in the deeper sense 
that we have the ‘wrong’ concepts. These skeptical possibilities are a consequence 
of  the Metaphysical Realists’ denial that there is any conceptual relationship at 
all between truth and rational justification. For Putnam, that is a serious misstep. 
For one thing it misses an important insight of  the verificationist tradition: 
namely, that for ordinary empirical concepts like that of  tree, dog or chair “there is 
a conceptual connection between grasping [such] an empirical concept and being 
able to recognize a perceptually justified application of  that concept” (1995, 295).
2. Internal Realism: insights and oversights.
Internal realism was formulated precisely to avoid this mistake (cf. Putnam, 
1978, Part 4). It is designed to allow for a greater sensitivity to the diverse normative 
outlooks of  our various practices. On the internal realist view, truth is defined 
as idealized rational assertibility where what is rationally assertible is allowed, 
contingently, to outrun what anyone can in fact rationally assert. Internal realism 
repairs the Metaphysical Realist’s denial of  any conceptual relationship between 
truth and justification yet it is supposed to capture our realist proclivities in making 
allowance for truths not actually verified and for which there may be no humanly 
possible verification e.g. truths about things or events beyond our light cone or 
about the distant past, say, whether a dinosaur was or was not drinking water at 
certain time and place in the Mesozoic period. In other words the internal realist 
agrees that the empirical world is mind-independent on a reasonable interpretation 
of  that expression. The ordinary distinction between truth and justification is re-
constructed as the distinction between justification according to current evidence 
and “idealized” (i.e. good enough) justification.
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One important advantage this view has over positing a mysterious correspon-
dence relation is that we can explain truth in terms of  whatever counts as sufficiently 
well justified with regard to the subject matter that is in question. Another 
advantage is that we need no longer be committed to the Metaphysical Realist 
dogma that there is one true and complete description of  reality. That is, internal 
realism is compatible with conceptual relativity, the rarefied phenomenon of  a 
conceptual choice between one or other equally well justified (i.e. empirically 
equivalent) optional language for describing some aspect of  reality which leads 
to incompatible world-views that have different ontological commitments (e.g. 
treating space-time as a matter of  points rather than limits, accepting that there 
are mereological ‘objects’). It is the phenomenon of  conceptual relativity that 
makes allowance for their being more than one true and complete description of  
reality, which is incompatible with Metaphysical Realism.
Nonetheless, Putnam eventually came to see that the internal realist account of  
the relation between truth and justification itself failed to do justice to our practices 
since in some imaginable cases truth does indeed outstrip verification altogether. 
One of  Putnam’s examples is the truth-value of  the statement, “There are no 
intelligent extra-terrestrials,” a negative existential statement that, supposing it is 
contingently true – that is, supposing that it is possible that there are intelligent 
extraterrestrials but there just do not happen to be any – is one that we are unable to 
verify. This is a result based on what we know of  physical theory and the absolute 
limit constituted by the speed of  light, namely, that for any given observer there are 
regions of  space-time that that observer cannot receive causal signals from since 
they are beyond the observer’s light cone.
3. Common Sense Realism: the articulation of  the normative  
from the practitioner’s point of  view
What, then, of  the turn to common sense realism? Putnam remarks,
…commonsense realism by itself  isn’t a metaphysical position, or even an 
antimetaphysical position… The strategy is not to counterpoise an alternative 
thesis to the various theses of  the traditional epistemologists, be they realist theses 
or idealist theses or empiricist theses or whatever. It consists rather in, first, taking 
perfectly seriously our ordinary claims to know about the existence of  birds and 
automobiles and what Austin referred to as “middle-sized dry goods,” and our ordinary 
explanations of  how we know those things, and, secondly, in meeting the objection 
that these ordinary claims simply ignore a philosophical problem by challenging the 
very intelligibility of  the supposed problem. (1998, 242; emphases added)
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And
let me say that (as opposed to metaphysical realism) commonsense realism always 
seems to ignore (or beg) the philosophical problem rather than respond to it. (241, sic.)
According to these formulations common sense realism is not a substantial 
philosophical doctrine but, in opposition to that, a Wittgensteinian diagnostic 
approach which regards philosophical problems as confusions that are only 
apparently intelligible. The job of  the common sense realist, on this construal, 
is to dismantle the illusion of  intelligibility of  any philosophy that attempts to 
undermine the common sense world and, thereby, show that there is no genuine 
problem of  realism or idealism left to answer. It follows that there is no need to 
offer any theory of  common sense reality our grip on which is presupposed in our 
ability to think and talk whether about birds, cars, people and so on. Looked at like 
this the task seems disappointingly negative.
It is important, then, that one can extend the trajectory of  Putnam’s thinking 
we have been following and see common sense realism as another step in the 
program of  understanding the way that central normative notions such as truth 
and justification relate to one another in specific regions of  discourse – making 
allowance for a plurality of  such relations (and a plurality of  forms of  rational 
justification) depending on the discourse in question. This exploratory and parti-
cularist approach is borne out by Putnam’s being prepared to speak of  common 
sense realism about perception, common sense realism about conception, and 
about rule-following, number theory, provability, tables and chairs, and empirical 
science – a list that can obviously be extended.
In Putnam’s vision the ordinary world of  middle-sized perceptible objects (e.g. 
buildings, cars, trees, pets, sofas, cups) – the “manifest image” as Sellars famously 
calls it – is in many ways more basic in epistemological terms than the “scientific 
image” which, in certain respects, is less certain, more changeable, and more open 
to reinterpretation. With regard to the manifest image, Putnam is prepared to say 
that truth and rational assertibility coincide – even if  we deny the central thesis of  
internal realism that the concept of  truth can be reduced to that of  (good enough) 
verification. Putnam explains,
what I contend is that, in the case of  the great majority of  our everyday assertions, 
assertions about the familiar objects and persons and animals with which we 
interact, truth and idealized rational acceptability do coincide. The reason that they 
so often coincide is not, however, that truth means idealized rational acceptability, 
but that, first, it is built into our picture of  the world itself  that these statements 
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can be verified under good enough conditions (when they are true); and, second, 
the existence of  statements of  this kind is a conceptual prerequisite of  our being 
able to understand a language at all. (1995, 299)
Having a firm grip on the common sense world is a crucial precondition for 
our capacity to share a language together, to express ourselves in that language 
and, thereby, to make ourselves understood by others.
But why common sense realism? Putnam’s use of  the term “common sense” does 
not indicate a dubious Moorean reliance on so-called “common sense propositions” 
which supposedly form a repository of  certain knowledge held in common by 
everyone (or at least a majority of  people) of  sound mind or something along those 
lines. Common sense, rather, refers to acknowledging the indispensable place in our 
lives of  the ordinary claims about ordinary things made from within our practices. 
That is what it means to take them seriously. This is not just an intellectual matter but 
something we have a feeling for, which is why it is a “sense”; and it is “common” 
partly for the reason that the language that presuppose and articulates it is a social 
phenomenon. Significantly, it does not require any philosophical foundation or 
guarantee. In this respect Putnam aligns with Wittgenstein when he wrote “the 
practice has to speak for itself ” (1972, §139).11
The term “common sense” also draws attention to the attempt to display our 
understanding of  the normativity of  the relevant concepts from the practitioner’s (or 
agent’s) point of  view, as opposed to an external scientific point of  view (e.g., the 
anthropological approach of  Huw Price’s subject naturalism (Price, 2011), or Paul 
Horwich’s theory of  language use (Horwich, 2005)). Arguably, the conceptual or 
rational normativity manifested in language use becomes invisible from the point 
of  view of  the strongly objectifying stance of  the scientist.12
Let us briefly consider common sense realism about ethics. Ethical truths do 
not depend on metaphysics, say, a special non-natural realm of  distinctively ethical 
objects or properties as G. E. Moore intuitionism supposed. Justification here is 
complex and multivalent: it can involve reasoning about a matter in the right way; 
imaginatively sharing a perspective on the world; or perhaps modelling oneself  on 
11 Also, for Putnam, common sense is not sacrosanct in the way that Moore or ordinary lan-
guage philosophers supposed. Putnam sees his job as that of  constructing what he likes to 
call “mild rational reconstructions” of  our practices as part of  his attempt to make best sense 
of  them.
12 I have argued for this claim at length in Macarthur (2014). 
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an exemplary person (e.g. Ghandi)13. Also, unlike mathematical or scientific truths, 
which can outrun what we have epistemic access to, such transcendent truths 
are not something that we would countenance with respect to ethical claims. 
Although we accept that ethical truths can be lost on an entire community (as, e.g., 
the injustice of  slavery was in ancient Greece) we do not allow that there could be 
present ethical truths that we could not possibly know about. And in this respect 
the same appears to be true of  aesthetic truths, and other evaluative matters.
thE ProBLEM oF thE third Way:  
dEFLationary vs inFLationary MEtaPhysiCs
Nonetheless, the present account of  Putnam's progress is not the whole 
story. According to an insightful retrospective survey, Gary Ebbs sees Putnam 
as primarily in the business of  attempting “to clarify our implicit practice-based 
understanding of  these norms” – viz., “norms that determine what we are talking 
about, when we agree, and when we disagree” – but he makes the following 
revealing admission,
The view I present… is perhaps incompatible with some of  what he has written. 
(1992, 2)
Indeed! So, too, the present paper is incompatible with some of  what Putnam 
has written. However, this “some” is not a minor or dispensable aspect of  
Putnam’s work but involves “the realism issue” which has always been at the core 
of  his philosophical concerns.14 Although Putnam has been centrally concerned 
with normative cartography, as we might call it – providing detailed maps of  
the normative fine-grain of  our linguistic practices and plotting the various faces 
of  objectivity from discourse to discourse – he has also repeatedly committed 
himself  to the realist positions that he later rounds on and criticizes.
In other words, Putnam is not happy to consistently practice philosophy in 
the metaphysically quietist manner of  Wittgenstein, who describes the logic of  
language as part of  a constant effort to overcome metaphysical assertion (despite 
sometimes sounding as if  he were content to do that). In retrospect it is clear 
that Putnam has always had a powerful inclination to answer the big metaphysical 
13 Putnam gave Ghandi as an example at a conference honouring his work at University Co-
llege, Dublin, in 2007.
14 Witness the large number of  Putnam’s books with the terms “realism” or “reality” in the title. 
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questions of  philosophy, especially the question, “How does language (or mind) 
hook up to the world?” even in spite of  a recognition of  how loaded this (and 
other metaphysical questions like it) is; and despite an acute awareness of  how 
metaphysical uses of  language tend to raise significant problems of  coherence 
and intelligibility.
There is a deep – and, for this reader at least, philosophically fruitful – fault line 
in Putnam's thinking between a metaphysically deflationary and a metaphysically 
inflationary conception of  the search for a “third way” in the realism debate: 1) 
metaphysically deflationary: offering a Wittgensteinian diagnosis of  the realism issue 
which does not require one to take sides in this (or any) metaphysical debate 
nor to propose a moderate “middle” position. Such metaphysical quietism goes 
hand in hand with providing a more realistic account of  the norms of  linguistic 
practice (meaning a more plausible account of  how reasonable or competent 
participants in linguistic practice should reflectively understand themselves) since 
a key theme of  Putnam’s is that such norms require no metaphysical foundations; 
and 2) metaphysically inflationary: providing a moderate metaphysical position that 
is conceived as located between the two extremes of  metaphysical construction 
(e.g. Metaphysical Realism) and metaphysical destruction (e.g. external world 
skepticism, relativism) (1999, 18).
The metaphysically deflationary mode is centrally concerned with the 
penetrating normative cartography which has led to many of  Putnam’s most 
influential discoveries, e.g., his account of  our reference to natural kind terms like 
gold (1988, ch. 2). Once again, a false metaphysical account of  the matter must be 
cleared away in order to make room for a just and suitably nuanced description of  
our actual practice. This point has been missed because all too frequently Putnam 
has been misread as committed to a version of  Kripke’s substance essentialism. 
Putnam’s actual claim is that, in our scientifically minded culture (one that extends 
back several centuries at least), the ordinary reference of  a natural kind term is 
interdependent with, and so conditioned by, the scientific community’s intention 
to refer to the natural kind’s hidden microstructure (e.g. gold is the element with 
the atomic number 79). The moral is that it is not metaphysics that tells us how 
to use our natural kind terms (contra Kripke) but a certain historically situated 
scientific practice.15
15 This may seem a surprizing example since many philosophers assume Putnam follows Kri-
pke in thinking that natural kinds have a metaphysical essence as a matter of  metaphysical 
necessity. Putnam, however, finds such metaphysical notions dubious and of  questionable 
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But we cannot avoid Putnam’s inflationary mode of  philosophizing as Ebbs 
understandably attempts to do. An example is Putnam’s late return to a form of  
metaphysical realism (uncapitalized) (cf. 2012, ch. 2). As we have seen, the account of  
Putnam as a normative cartographer fits particularly well with common sense realism 
which is explicitly said to be a non-metaphysical outlook (i.e. neither metaphysical 
nor anti-metaphysical) whose aim is to defend our ordinary ways of  talking about 
the past, other people, tables and chairs, and so on from metaphysical attack.
Unfortunately, Putnam effectively backslides when he pledges allegiance to 
a sophisticated form of  metaphysical realism which, unlike traditional Metaphysical 
Realism (capitalized), is compatible with conceptual relativity.16 The label “meta-
physical realist”, Putnam explains,
[applies] to all philosophers who reject verificationism and all talk of  our “making” 
the world (2012, 101)
For anyone sympathetic to the metaphysically deflationary mode of  philoso-
phizing – articulating in detail the complex normative topography of  our practices 
from a participant perspective – this metaphysical pronouncement will seem an 
unfortunate and retrograde step. Like all forms of  metaphysics, metaphysical real-
ism suffers from the problem of  dogmatic over-generalization, falling victim to 
what Wittgenstein called the philosophical “craving for generality” (1969, 18) – 
the wish to explain things in full generality from the armchair.
For a start, Putnam seems to have forgotten that common sense realism was 
topic-specific and that he accepts something close to verificationism with regard to 
common sense talk about ordinary perceptible objects as well as about ethical and 
legal (and, presumably, also aesthetic and political) discourse: for, in such cases, 
intelligibility. He remarks, “I could understand [Kripke’s notion of  individual essences], at 
best, only by regarding them as linguistic proposals for assigning truth-values to certain coun-
terfactuals in a not implausible way” (1990, 67). For the common misreading of  Putnam as an 
essentialist see, e.g., Bird and Tobin (2018). 
16 Arguably one reason why Putnam adopts this metaphysical position is as an over-reaction 
to the criticism that he has made the “flat-out philosophical mistake” of  thinking that “there 
are no objects independent of  conceptual scheme” (Thomasson, 2015, 60) – which is an 
understandable misinterpretation given that Putnam for a time confused conceptual relativity, 
where conceptual choice does determine ontology in a limited domain, with conceptual pluralism, 
the distinct thesis that there are different descriptions of  the world (say, in the language of  
physics, or of  common sense objects) no one of  which is metaphysically primary. See, e.g., 
Putnam (1987, lecture 2). 
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“truth cannot transcend warranted assertibility under good enough conditions” 
(2002a, 108).17 And, to ward off  a possible objection at this point, Putnam certainly 
accepts that, say, ethical values and the ethical life in which they figure are part of  
the world that the (sophisticated) metaphysical realist is theorizing about; and the 
same goes for legal, aesthetic and political values. Putnam could reply that the aim 
is only to deny the reduction of  the concept of  truth to that of  verification; but if  
that is all that is going on then there is no reason to think of  it as a contribution 
to metaphysics. It is a conceptual insight!
A similar problem arises for Putnam’s blanket rejection of  all talk of  ‘making’ 
the world. What of  the urban landscape, the built world of  the city, its architecture, 
parks, roads and bridges? Or all of  the many and various artifacts like tables, chairs, 
coffee cups and pencils? And what of  institutional facts such as that two people 
are married or that writing on a piece of  paper under certain conditions counts as 
voting? Surely all such facts are made by us, causally or constitutively, or both.
In defending his late turn to metaphysical realism Putnam writes,
And if  I have long repented of  having once said that “the mind and the world 
make up the mind and the world,” that is because what we actually make up is not 
the world, but language games, concepts, uses, conceptual schemes. To confuse 
making up the notion of  a boson, which is something the scientific community 
did over time, with making up real quantum mechanical systems is to slide into 
idealism, it seems to me. And that was a bad thing to slide into. (2012, 76)
But, as we have just seen, a great deal of  the social world we do, in fact, make 
up so metaphysical realism is either false or misleading! Furthermore, Putnam’s 
acceptance of  the criticism of  his having said that “the mind and the world make 
up the mind and the world” as a “slide into idealism” is to forget that when he 
originally spoke in these terms he was explicitly speaking metaphorically,
My view is not a view in which the mind makes up the world… If  one must 
use metaphorical language, then let the metaphor be this: the mind and the 
world make up the mind and the world. (1981, xi, emphasis added)
The explicitly metaphorical claim concerning the mind and world’s co-
constitutive activity is not to be understood as a commitment to a new moderate 
17 In line with the objectivist focus of  the current paper Putnam remarks further, “there is no 
reason to suppose that one cannot be what is called a ‘moral realist’ in meta-ethics, that is, hold 
that some ‘value judgments’ are true as a matter of  objective fact, without holding that moral 
facts are or can be recognition transcendent facts” (2002a, 108).
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metaphysical position in the realism-idealism debate but is a deflationary move 
aimed at the rejection of  both positions – certainly a rejection of  the idea that we 
face a forced choice between them.18 Note, too, that in this initial formulation, 
Putnam explicitly distances himself  from any idealist supposition that the mind 
“makes up” the world as a whole – although it is again incautious and misleading 
since, for one thing, the vast realm of  artefacts is made by our minds.
If  there was a slide into idealism along Putnam’s path it was in adopting 
“internal realism” where this involves the wholesale reduction of  truth to idealized 
rational assertibility as follows:
S is true if  and only if  believing S would be justified if  epistemic conditions were 
good enough.
As Putnam later realized, since internal realism took for granted an interface 
conception of  perception, the notion of  epistemically “ideal” conditions of  
justification inevitably collapses into solipsism (2012, 83–4).19 Again, the fault lies 
in Putnam’s apparent wish to engage with the traditional metaphysical questions 
and, despite occasional Wittgensteinian misgivings, to offer definitive – although 
qualified – answers to them. Putnam arguably should have been content to 
philosophize in the metaphysically deflationary mode making such correct 
observations as that we should resist reducing truth to any epistemic notion, and 
from the point of  view of  which we are able to acknowledge two key insights of  
verificationism (even if  they require a reinterpretation of  that doctrine):
1) “that truth and rational acceptability are interdependent notions” even if  
there are cases in which truth transcends what we can find out about 
(1988, 115);
2) “some subject matters [e.g. talk about the furniture in the room, ethics, law] 
are such that their very nature entails that if  the statement in question is 
true, then the statement can, under certain conditions, be verified” (2002a, 
108). The coincidence of  truth and rational assertibility in many everyday 
and evaluative cases does not entail that the concept of  truth is reducible 
to that of  rational assertibility.
18 It is clear that at this time Putnam regarded the realist-idealist debate as incoherent if  taken 
at face value so talk of  “choosing” either side is moot.
19 The question he did not face is, how can an internal realist refer to epistemically ideal con-
ditions?
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An insight we can draw from Putnam in his metaphysically deflationary 
mapping of  social normative space and the different kinds and strengths of  
objectivity it makes available is that the relations between truth and justification 
(or rational assertibility) are simply too varied and complex across subject matters 
and situations to be capable of  being fruitfully captured in any general doctrine 
of  realism or antirealism.20
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